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Since 2004, the Republic of Iraq has undertaken a concerted effort to comply with 
all of its international obligations to prevent the proliferation and the use of chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. A centerpiece of this effort is Iraq’s 
development of a National Biorisk Management System. The Iraqi National Monitoring 
Authority (INMA), which is responsible for CBRN security and non-proliferation in Iraq, 
has played a key role in establishing this system. This article provides an overview of 
Iraq’s international non-proliferation commitments, describes the legal and organizational 
steps it has taken to implement these commitments, and examines current initiatives to 
strengthen Iraq’s biosecurity.
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irAQ’s iMPLeMeNtAtiON OF its NON-PrOLiFerAtiON 
cOMMitMeNts
Since 2004, Iraq has strengthened its commitment to the non-proliferation of CBRN weapons. Iraq 
is now party to all of the major international non-proliferation treaties (see Table 1). Iraq welcomed 
the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and submitted its first 
National Report to the 1540 Committee on April 13, 2005. In 2014, Iraq submitted a report to the 
committee on its experiences, best practices, and lessons learned from implementation of UNSCR 
1540 (1).
Iraq has taken a series of practical steps to implement its obligations under international non-
proliferation treaties to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means 
of delivery to states and non-state actors. Article 9, paragraph e of Iraq’s constitution, adopted by 
popular referendum in 2005, states that: “the Iraqi government shall respect and implement Iraq’s 
international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production and 
non-use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and shall prohibit associated equipment, mate-
rial, technologies and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production, and 
use of such weapons.”
In 2006, Iraq began developing national legislation to implement and enforce its treaty and con-
stitutional commitments to prevent the proliferation of CBRN weapons and their means of delivery. 
The draft law was reviewed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization in charge of 
implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Iraqi parliament passed the National 
Monitoring Authority for Non-Proliferation Act No. 48 (2012) on February 16, 2012 and the legislation 
went into effect on September 1, 2012. The Act prohibits the development, production, possession, 
tABLe 1 | iraq’s non-proliferation commitments.
treaty Date of 
signature
Date of ratification 
or accession
Geneva Protocol September 8, 1931
Partial Test Ban Treaty August 13, 1963 December 3, 1964
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) July 1, 1968 October 29, 1969
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) May 11, 1972 June 19, 1991
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT)
August 19, 2008 September 26, 
2013
IAEA’s Additional Protocol October 9, 2008 October 10, 2012
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) January 13, 2009
Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) June, 2011 June, 2011
Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material
July 7, 2014
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transfer, or use of CBRN weapons and their means of delivery and 
establishes a system to control the import, export, and transfer of 
dual-use materials. Violations of the law can be punished by fines 
of up to 200 million Iraqi dinars and life imprisonment.
irAQi NAtiONAL MONitOriNG 
AUtHOritY
The National Monitoring Authority for Non-Proliferation Act No. 
48 (2012) established the INMA, part of the Ministry of Science 
and Technology, as the main agency charged with implementing 
the new legislation. INMA was formed on the basis of the National 
Monitoring Directorate that had been created in 1993 to serve 
as Iraq’s official liaison with the IAEA and the United Nations 
Special Commission (UNSCOM), the organization charged by 
the United Nations Security Council after the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War with overseeing Iraq’s disarmament in the fields of missiles 
and chemical and biological weapons. INMA’s overarching goal 
is to establish and maintain a national system of monitoring, 
investigation, and inspection that enables Iraq to comply with its 
national and international non-proliferation obligations. INMA 
is organized into five main functional departments (Nuclear, 
Biological, Chemical, Means of Delivery, and Import/Export) and 
a number of supporting units (Operations, Research and Studies, 
Administrative, Legal and Financial, Public and International 
Relations, and Chairman’s Office).
Iraqi National Monitoring Authority has three primary func-
tions: compliance, monitoring of dual-use materials, and capacity 
building. First, INMA is the lead agency for interacting with inter-
national non-proliferation organizations and is responsible for 
ensuring Iraqi compliance with its international non- proliferation 
commitments. To achieve this objective, INMA is the designated 
point of contact for the OPCW, the BWC’s Implementation 
Support Unit (ISU), the IAEA, the 1540 Committee, and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. INMA is also 
responsible for preparing declarations and reports required by 
these organizations and accompanies inspection teams from 
these organizations during their visits to Iraq. In the context 
of the BWC, INMA compiles and submits annual confidence-
building measure reports to the ISU and participates in meetings 
of experts, meetings of state parties, and review conferences (2).
Iraqi National Monitoring Authority’s second major func-
tion is to develop regulations and mechanisms to monitor the 
production, use, storage, import, export, and shipping of dual-use 
materials to ensure their safe, secure, and peaceful application in 
accordance with national and international laws and standards. 
INMA, in cooperation with other Iraqi ministries, has developed 
a national system to control the import, export, and movement 
of dual-use materials. Iraq’s list of controlled dual-use materials 
is based on lists maintained by the Missile Technology Control 
Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australian Group, Wassenaar 
Arrangement, and EU Law No. 2000/1334. All Government 
institutions and private sector companies and individuals who 
intend to import or export dual-use items must obtain a license 
from the Ministry of Trade (MOT). MOT is responsible for 
checking the accuracy of the information and forwarding the 
information to INMA for registration. If INMA grants permis-
sion for the requested license, MOT sends a copy of the license 
to the General Authority for Customs (GAC). GAC matches 
the shipping manifests of dual-use materials being transferred 
with the information in the license and informs its inspectors at 
border crossings who are responsible for checking the imported 
or exported materials against the license. If the license is for an 
import, INMA conducts a follow-up inspection with the end user 
of the material and makes any declaration required under interna-
tional non-proliferation treaties. The Ministry of Transportation 
issues instructions regarding the transfer of chemical, biological, 
radioactive, and hazardous materials, ensures carriers comply 
with safety and security standards, and reports any transfers or 
retransfers of dual-use materials to INMA.
Iraqi National Monitoring Authority’s third major task is to 
develop and implement capacity building programs to enhance 
Iraq’s ability to prevent the proliferation of CBRN weapons to 
states and non-state actors and strengthen Iraq’s preparedness for 
responding to the use of such weapons. To fulfill this function, 
INMA has started to hold workshops for managers and staff of 
different Iraqi ministries to raise awareness of the threat of CBRN 
weapons, the identification of dual-use materials, and implemen-
tation of UNSCR 1540. INMA has also launched several projects, 
in cooperation with foreign partners, including the United States, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway, Germany, and Jordan, to 
enhance Iraq’s capacity to detect and respond to man-made and 
naturally occurring biological threats.
iNitiAtives tO streNGtHeN 
BiOsecUritY iN irAQ
In 2012, INMA proposed the creation of a high-level interagency 
coordinating body to create a comprehensive National Biorisk 
Management System in Iraq. INMA worked with the Public 
Health Directorate of the Ministry of Health to identify institu-
tions that should be represented on this committee and to deter-
mine the committee’s goals for strengthening Iraq’s preparedness 
for natural and man-made disease outbreaks. On May 1, 2012, 
the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers issued order 
No.18778 which established the National Biorisk Management 
Committee (NBMC). The NBMC is chaired by the Ministry of 
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Health and is composed of representatives from the following 
ministries: Agriculture, Defense, Interior, Higher Education, 
Finance, Planning, Industry, Prime Minister’s Council, Science 
and Technology, Environment, Prime Minister’s Advisory 
Commission, Trade, and Water Resource and Irrigation. 
Additional ministries participate as is necessary.
The NBMC has identified four priorities for strengthening 
Iraq’s national capacity to counter biological threats: establishing 
a national pathogen list, building laboratory capacity, developing 
the capability to conduct joint law enforcement–public health 
investigations, and establishing a biorisk management law. The 
NBMC has established sub-committees charged with developing 
new policies and programs to achieve these four objectives.
National Pathogen List
The NBMC is leading the development of a comprehensive 
list of human, plant, animal, and zoonotic pathogens that will 
serve multiple purposes in Iraq’s National Biorisk Management 
System. The national pathogen list will become part of the system 
regulating the import, export, and transfer of dual-use materi-
als. In addition, the list will be used to determine appropriate 
biosafety and biosecurity measures that laboratories will need to 
implement. Finally, the list will be used to guide bioterrorism pre-
paredness and response activities. A subcommittee of the NBMC, 
which is composed of INMA, the Ministry of Public Health, 
and the Ministry of Agriculture, has worked on developing the 
list since the beginning of 2014. The subcommittee has used 
pathogen lists developed by other countries and international 
organizations, including the United States, European Union, and 
Australia Group, as a starting point for its work. However, these 
lists are shaped by national security, public health, agricultural, 
and economic factors unique to each country and organiza-
tion. For example, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is viewed 
as a top bioterrorist threat by the United States due to the high 
vulnerability of its cattle to this disease and the severe economic 
consequences that an FMD outbreak would have (3). By contrast, 
FMD is endemic in Iraq and to cope with recurrent major FMD 
outbreaks, Iraq has developed a robust veterinary and vaccine 
response strategy (4). Therefore, imposing tight biosecurity 
limits on FMD virus would not make sense for Iraq. Instead of 
incorporating an existing pathogen list directly into its National 
Biorisk Management System, the subcommittee has sought to 
identify key criteria used to develop these lists and adapt them 
to Iraq’s unique situation. During the spring of 2015, one of the 
authors served as an CRDF Global Iraqi Bioscience Fellow at 
George Mason University where he evaluated the criteria used 
by the United States and European countries to assess and rank 
the safety and security risks posed by different pathogens. Based 
on this evaluation and other biorisk assessment exercises, the 
NBMC is considering applying the following criteria to generate 
its national pathogen list: pathogenicity, mode of transmission, 
route of exposure, level of morbidity and mortality, degree of 
antibiotic resistance, local availability of effective treatments and 
preventive measures, local diagnostic capabilities, potential eco-
nomic losses caused by animal and plant agents, and the potential 
impact on the health-care system.
Building Laboratory capacity
A strong public health laboratory system is the foundation for an 
effective defense against naturally occurring infectious diseases 
and bioterrorism. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture main-
tain networks of laboratories to conduct surveillance, detection, 
and diagnosis of human, animal, and plant disease outbreaks (5). 
These ministries operate laboratories at biosafety level 1 and 2, 
which limits Iraq’s capability to safely conduct diagnostic tests 
on viruses such as highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza (6). 
Since 2009, the INMA has engaged in cooperative programs 
with Switzerland and the United States to rebuild Iraq’s public 
health laboratory capacity with the ultimate goal of establishing a 
biosafety level 3 laboratory. Iraqi officials and scientists from the 
Ministries of Agriculture, Health, and Science and Technology 
have received training on biosafety, biosecurity, emergency pre-
paredness and response, and biorisk mitigation. Iraq has received 
assistance from the United States in the areas of disease surveil-
lance, detection, diagnosis, biosafety, and biosecurity. To guide 
this work, INMA established an interagency technical working 
group to review Iraq’s biosurveillance capabilities, identify gaps, 
and propose solutions. The United States is in the process of 
upgrading the equipment at Iraqi public health and veterinary labs 
and linking provincial-level labs into a nation-wide network to 
improve Iraqi biosurveillance capabilities for human and animal 
disease outbreaks. This initiative helps Iraq meet its commitment 
under the 2005 International Health Regulations to develop core 
capacities in laboratory services and disease surveillance. In addi-
tion, the United States has provided some Iraqi laboratories with 
upgrades to their physical security, including the installation of 
electronic door locks to prevent unauthorized access to pathogen 
collections. Areas in need of further investment include improv-
ing biological waste management systems at public health labs, 
developing education and training curriculum, standardizing 
laboratory protocols, and developing an indigenous capability to 
maintain and repair biosafety equipment.
Public Health–Law enforcement 
investigation
The potential for terrorists to employ CBRN weapons poses new 
challenges to both law enforcement and public health. Of all of 
the CBRN threats, biological weapons are the most difficult to 
investigate because of the potentially long delay between when 
an attack occurs and when the government becomes aware that 
an attack has taken place. Since it can be difficult to initially 
determine if a suspicious outbreak is natural or deliberate, public 
health authorities need to know when and how to contact law 
enforcement agencies if they suspect an outbreak is not natural. 
Likewise, law enforcement agencies need to be aware of the types 
of information that could indicate a terrorist group is interested 
in, has acquired, or has released biological agents and have proce-
dures for sharing such information with public health authorities. 
Once it has been confirmed that an attack has occurred, public 
health and law enforcement agencies will need to coordinate 
their investigations to ensure that they collect and share the right 
information in a timely manner (7). The Ministry of Interior 
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(MoI), which is in charge of investigating acts of terrorism, does 
not have a history of working with either the Ministry of Health 
or Ministry of Agriculture. Although MoI has extensive experi-
ence dealing with conventional improvised explosive devices and 
explosive ordnance disposal, it does not have any capacity for 
dealing with CBRN weapons or contaminated evidence. INMA 
is working to establish a joint public health–criminal investigative 
capacity in Iraq by holding interagency meetings, workshops, and 
training sessions to develop plans and procedures for information 
sharing and investigation in the event of a CBRN incident.
Biorisk Management Law
Iraq lacks a legal framework for regulating the full range of 
biological risks, including disease outbreaks caused by natural 
sources, terrorists, and laboratory accidents, which threaten 
Iraq’s health and security. The NBMC has formed a subcommittee 
headed by INMA to draft a new law to provide a legal umbrella 
for the implementation of biorisk management policy in Iraq, 
including the national pathogen list, associated biosafety and 
laboratory security regulations, and the roles and responsibilities 
of different Iraqi ministries in strengthening Iraq’s preparedness 
for natural and deliberate disease threats. The NBMC’s goal is to 
issue the new law within 2–3 years.
cONcLUsiON
Since 2004, Iraq has made significant progress in improving its 
capacity to prevent the proliferation of CBRN weapons and their 
means of delivery in accordance with its legal, constitutional, 
and treaty obligations. Iraqi efforts to strengthen its prepared-
ness for natural and deliberate disease threats has received 
valuable assistance from foreign partners who have engaged 
in collaborative capacity building activities over an extended 
period of time. A major challenge facing Iraq is the need to 
sustain these capabilities over time, especially if foreign assis-
tance declines. Iraq will need to continue making investments 
in infrastructure, information technology, and human capital 
to ensure that its biosafety, biosecurity, and biosurveillance 
systems remain effective. The INMA has played a key role in 
Iraq’s development of a National Biorisk Management System, 
but achieving the four objectives established by the NMBC will 
require further interagency cooperation among Iraqi ministries 
as well as continued support from Iraq’s foreign partners. Only 
by working together can Iraq and the international community 
reduce the risks posed by infectious diseases, bioterrorism, and 
the misuse of biology.
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